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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this diversity case, we conclude that a plaintiff with 
claims less than the jurisdictional amount may not invoke 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1367 where a 
co-plaintiff's more substantial ones meet the requisite 
amount. We also decide that the District Court correctly 
held that the meaning of "collapse" in a property insurance 
policy requires a caving in or falling in of a structure and 
that the existence of serious impairment of structural 
integrity is insufficient to invoke coverage. Accordingly, we 
will remand the claims of one plaintiff to the state court 
from which it was removed, and affirm summary judgment 
in favor of the insurance carrier on the other plaintiff's 
claims. 
 
Plaintiffs Meritcare, Inc. and Meritcare Ventures, Inc. 
operate a nursing home in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. They 
lease the structure from its owner Caring I, Ltd.1 Plaintiff 
Quinlan Medical, Inc. is a subsidiary of Meritcare and 
furnishes "liquefied" food and other products to the 
residents. 
 
On December 27, 1994, Caring advised Meritcare that 
the roof on the nursing home was structurally unsound 
and posed a safety hazard. The facility was closed and all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parties have represented to the Court that Meritcare, Inc. and 
Meritcare Ventures, Inc. are both insured under the same policies and 
have an indivisible claim. They will frequently be referred to as 
"Meritcare" for convenience. 
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of its residents were moved to other institutions by January 
6, 1995. They did not begin to return until after the roof 
replacement was completed on February 13, 1995. The 
nursing home did not obtain its previous occupancy level 
until June 15, 1995. 
 
Defendant St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company had 
issued policies to Meritcare, Inc., Meritcare Ventures, Inc., 
and Quinlan that provided property damage and business 
interruption coverage. The insurance company denied 
plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the policies covered 
losses from a roof "collapse" and that in this instance the 
roof, although structurally unsound, did not fall in. 
 
Meritcare, Inc., Meritcare Ventures, Inc., and Quinlan 
filed suit in Pennsylvania state court on June 6, 1995, 
claiming damages "exceed[ing] $25,000.00." St. Paul 
removed the case to the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, and in its Notice of Removal 
alleged that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, 
the then-applicable amount.2 
 
Plaintiffs did not challenge the amount in controversy at 
that time, nor did they move for remand at anytime. They 
later amended their complaint to add a claim under the 
Pennsylvania Bad Faith Insurer statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 
S 8371, asking for punitive damages, costs, and attorneys' 
fees. Meritcare also requested damages for the loss of an 
opportunity to purchase the facility under an option in the 
lease. St. Paul filed counterclaims for misrepresentation, 
insurance fraud, and bad faith. 
 
In their respective pretrial statements, both the plaintiffs 
and defendant stated that Quinlan's compensatory claims 
amounted to no more than $5,000. At that point, for the 
first time, St. Paul challenged the District Court's 
jurisdiction over Quinlan's claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The amount in controversy has since been increased to $75,000. See 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, Title II, 
S 205(a), 110 Stat. 3850 (amending 28 U.S.C.S 1332(a), effective 90 days 
from enactment date of Oct. 19, 1996). Because plaintiffs' complaint was 
filed prior to January 1997, the applicable jurisdictional amount in this 
case is $50,000. 
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The District Court granted summary judgment to St. 
Paul, holding that the deteriorated condition of the roof was 
not a "collapse" under the policy and Pennsylvania law. The 
Court did not discuss or rule on the jurisdictional objection 
to Quinlan's claim. After the Court issued an order under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the plaintiffs appealed. St. Paul's 
counterclaims are still pending in the District Court and 




We first address the rather complicated issues raised by 
the fact that Quinlan's claim does not appear to meet the 
amount in controversy required in diversity cases. We 
exercise plenary review over this question of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 
1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
A federal court has the obligation to address a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Employer's 
Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 42, 
45 (3d Cir. 1990). In particular, in removal cases, "[i]f at 
any time before final judgment it appears that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 
remanded." 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c). As we said in Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742 
(3d Cir. 1995), this statute enables "a district court to 
address the question of jurisdiction, even if the parties do 
not raise the issue." Id. at 750. In assessing the amount in 
controversy, it is also important to bear in mind that the 
parties may not confer jurisdiction by consent, see United 
Indus. Workers v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 987 
F.2d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 1993), a principle that is equally 
applicable in removal as well as original jurisdiction cases. 
See Liberty Mutual, 48 F.3d at 750. 
 
A defendant may remove a case in "any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441(a). "The propriety of removal thus depends on 
whether the case originally could have been filed in federal 
court." City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 
118 S. Ct. 523, 529 (1997). 
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Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a) rests upon not 
only diversity of citizenship -- which is not in doubt here -- 
but also in meeting the requisite amount in controversy. 
Those constraints carry over to Section 1441, which is to be 
strictly construed against removal, see Boyer v. Snap-On 
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), so that the 
congressional intent to restrict federal diversity litigation is 
honored. See Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 293-95 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (federal judiciary has been "too timid" in 
eliminating the "plethora of cases which do not belong in 
federal courts"). 
 
The ad damnum clause in the complaint is often a 
convenient and customary reference point to ascertain the 
amount in controversy. However, the rules in many state 
courts place limits on the amounts that may be recited in 
ad damnum clauses. In this case, for example, in 
conformity with Pennsylvania state practice, the ad 
damnum clause states the damages requested "exceed[ ] 
$25,000.00," but does not specify actual damages. See Pa. 
R. Civ. P. 1021(b). This ad damnum clause, then, is little 
more than an open-ended claim that fails to answer the 
amount in controversy inquiry. 
 
Even though actual damages may not be established 
until later in the litigation, the amount in controversy is 
measured as of the date of removal, a practice similar to 
that in original jurisdiction suits where the inquiry is 
directed to the time when the complaint is filed. See 
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939); Abels v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985). 
When it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff was 
never entitled to recover the minimum amount set by 
Section 1332, the removed case must remanded even if the 
jurisdictional deficiency becomes evident only after trial. 
See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 
U.S. 283, 289 (1938). 
 
As we noted in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 1996), "[a] distinction 
must be made . . . between subsequent events that change 
the amount in controversy and subsequent revelations that, 
in fact, the required amount was or was not in controversy 
at the commencement of the action." Id. at 97 (alterations 
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in original). A respected treatise cautions that the "[f]ailure 
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount from the outset, 
although not recognized until later, is not a subsequent 
change that can be ignored." 15 James W. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice P 102.104[3], at 102-167 (3d ed. 
1998). Thus, if it develops that the requisite amount in 
controversy was never present, even if that fact is not 
established until the case is on appeal, the judgment of the 
District Court cannot stand. See American Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-19 (1951); Knop v. McMahan, 




In circumstances where two or more plaintiffs in state 
court have joined their claims, a question arises whether 
those claims may be aggregated to meet the required 
jurisdictional amount on removal. There is no dispute that 
Meritcare's claims exceed $50,000, and if combined with 
Quinlan's, would total more than $50,000, the minimum 
required by the diversity statute at the time. 
 
As succinctly stated in a leading treatise, the rule is 
"long-standing and seemingly well-settled . . . that the 
claims of several plaintiffs, if they are separate and distinct, 
cannot be aggregated for purposes of determining the 
amount in controversy." 14B Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 3704, at 134 (1994). The 
rule applies even if the plaintiffs have a community of 
interest, but fall short of establishing a single title or right 
in which they have a common and undivided interest. See 
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1942); Pinel v. 
Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916). 
 
In such circumstances, the claims of those plaintiffs who 
fail to meet the amount in controversy must be remanded. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Contrast this with the situation where the requisite diversity of 
citizenship did not exist at the time of removal, but was remedied before 
judgment. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 117 S. Ct. 467, 471 (1996); Knop, 
872 F.2d at 1138. In those instances, the judgments are valid. Contrast 
those cases, however, with cases where a judgment, having become final 
and no longer appealable, may not be collaterally attacked. See Chicot 
Co. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377 (1940). 
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See Clark v. Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939); see also 
Pinel, 240 U.S. at 596 (joinder case). Similarly, in a class 
action, each member of a class who does not meet the 
jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case. See 
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); 
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335-37 (1969). Although 
the present dispute involves parties joined for convenience, 
the line of cases from Pinel to Zahn applies equally to 
joinder cases and class actions. See, e.g., Snyder, 394 U.S. 
at 337 (treating class actions the same as cases with joined 
plaintiffs for purposes of aggregation rules); 1 Moore et al., 
supra, P 0.97[5], at 928-29 (1994) ("Snyder and Zahn 
simply mean that the aggregation rules formulated for 
cases involving multiple plaintiffs or defendants apply to 
class actions."). 
 
Aggregation based on the total of the claims asserted by 
Meritcare and Quinlan in this case cannot be used to 
satisfy Quinlan's jurisdictional amount. Although their 
claims stem from the same cause -- the roof "collapse" and 
shared insurance coverage -- they are separate and 
distinct. Quinlan alleges damages that differ from those of 




As an alternative, Quinlan relies on supplemental 
jurisdiction as conferred by the Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, S 310(a), 104 Stat. 5113 
(codified as 28 U.S.C. S 1367). Subsection (a) of Section 
1367 provides that when district courts have original 
jurisdiction they "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over 
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy . . . . Such supplemental 
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or 
intervention of additional parties." 
 
Subsection (b), however, narrows supplemental juris- 
diction in cases brought solely under the diversity statute, 
28 U.S.C. S 1332. In that context, supplemental jurisdiction 
does not extend to "claims by plaintiffs against persons 
made parties" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (third-party 
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practice), Rule 19 (mandatory joinder), Rule 20 (permissive 
joinder), Rule 24 (intervention), or "over claims by persons 
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 . . ., or 
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 . . . when 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims 
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements 
of section 1332." 
 
The enactment of Section 1367 was an outgrowth of a 
recommendation by the Federal Courts Study Committee 
that "Congress should expressly authorize federal courts to 
assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an 
independent federal jurisdictional base." Report of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Study 
Committee Report). That suggestion was based to some 
extent on a summary prepared for a subcommittee noting 
concern with the holding in Finley v. United States, 490 
U.S. 545 (1989). See Report of the Subcommittee on the 
Federal Courts and Their Relation to the States 547 (Mar. 
12, 1990) (Working Papers), reprinted in Federal Courts 
Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee 
Reports, Vol. I (July 1, 1990). 
 
In Finley, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in the 
District Court under the Federal Torts Claims Act, which 
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1346(b). She also sought to join a state-law claim, arising 
out of the same factual circumstances. Because the added 
defendant was not of diverse citizenship, the Supreme 
Court held that federal jurisdiction over the state claim did 
not exist. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 547, 555-56. The result 
was that separate suits would have to be filed in both state 
and federal courts. 
 
The subcommittee's Working Papers proposed that the 
Federal Courts Study Committee recommend legislation 
rejecting the holding in Finley, and restoring the previous 
state of the law. See Working Papers at 559-61. They also 
proposed a further broadening of pendent jurisdiction to 
provide a single forum for the disposition of related cases, 
and in a footnote disagreed with the holding in Zahn. See 
id. at 556-61 & n.33. However, somewhat inconsistently, in 
their primary recommendations, the Working Papers urged 
substantial limitations on diversity cases. See id. at 454. 
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The full Federal Courts Study Committee recommended 
that Congress substantially reduce diversity jurisdiction 
because of its expense to the federal system and the 
existence of alternate forums in state courts. See Study 
Committee Report at 14-15, 39-41. Consistent with that 
policy, the Committee also suggested that Congress enact 
legislation authorizing pendent jurisdiction that was limited 
in its scope. See id. at 47-48. The Committee did not adopt 
the subcommittee's footnote reference to Zahn. 
 
The Study Committee Report advocated a narrower view 
of pendent jurisdiction than the Working Papers, and 
recommended inclusion of claims arising out of the same 
transaction or occurrence "including claims, within federal 
question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional 
parties, namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has 
a closely related state claim." Id. at 47. It is clear that the 
Committee focused on Finley -- not Zahn -- and did not 
advocate substantially expanding diversity jurisdiction by 
"overruling" Zahn.4 See id. at 40. ("[W]e discuss broadening 
federal jurisdiction in certain cases that present both 
federal and state claims, such as cases with pendent state 
law claims."). 
 
The organization of Section 1367 makes it clear that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, S 3523.1, at 112 n.73 (Supp. 1998), 
it is asserted that the Federal Courts Study Committee "explicitly 
recommended the statutory overruling of Zahn," citing to the Working 
Papers at 561 n.33. As noted here, this recommendation was not in the 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, but in the Working 
Papers of a subcommittee, and was not adopted by the full Committee. 
To avoid such errors, the full Study Committee cautioned in the Working 
Papers: "[t]hese materials were valued background materials which the 
Committee determined should be published for general consideration 
whether or not the Committee agreed with their substantive 
proposals. . . . In no event should the enclosed materials be construed as 
having been adopted by the Committee." It is unfortunate that some 
commentators and courts have erroneously concluded that the Working 
Papers represented the view of the Federal Courts Study Committee. See 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 962 F. 
Supp. 450, 504-05 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd on other gds., 148 F.3d 283 (3d 
Cir. 1998); Leszczynski v. Allianz Ins., 176 F.R.D. 659, 665-66 (S.D. Fla. 
1997). 
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distinction is to be made between a narrow approach to 
diversity cases, as contrasted with a more expansive scope 
for other sources of jurisdiction, such as federal question 
litigation. This differentiation demonstrates an intent to 
prevent erosion of the diversity requirements through such 
"end-run" maneuvers as joining plaintiffs under Rules 19 or 
20 after a suit is filed, when they could not have been 
included as parties in the original complaint. As the House 
Committee Report stated: "In accord with case law, the 
subsection also prohibits the joinder or intervention of 
persons a[s] plaintiffs if adding them is inconsistent with 
section 1332's requirements." H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 29, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875. 
 
The limited reach of Section 1367 in diversity matters is 
supported by additional references in the legislative history. 
The House Committee was aided in its drafting by several 
legal scholars who had participated in the Federal Courts 
Study Committee's proceedings,5 and were aware of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Thomas M. Mengler, Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental 
Jurisdiction, 74 Judicature 213, 216 (1991)."[T]he legislative history 
makes clear that section 1367 is not intended to affect their [class 
actions under Rule 23] jurisdictional requirements . . . . [citing Zahn]. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's holdings that . . . all class members must 
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, remains good decisional 
law." Id. at 215. Section 1367 has engendered an unusually profuse and 
spirited academic debate. As representative -- but by no means complete 
-- see Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering 
Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 
Emory L.J. 445, 471 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank 
& Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About 
Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943 
(1991); see also Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt 
Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory 
L.J. 963, 981 (1991); Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: 
The Case of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1367, 19 
Seton Hall Legis. J. 157 (1994); Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, Congress 
Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation, supra . For a listing of other 
scholarly 
articles, see Packard, 994 F.2d at 1045 n.9. 
 
Moore's Federal Practice takes the position that on its face the statute 
appears to overrule Zahn, but that was not the intent of the statute's 
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Committee's views on limiting diversity jurisdiction. The 
Report of the House Subcommittee flatly states that Zahn's 
validity was not to be affected: "The section is not intended 
to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 1332 
in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were 
interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 29, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 (citing Supreme 
Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Zahn v. 
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)); see also 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration of Justice of the 
Committee of the Judiciary on H.R. 5381, 101st Cong., 2nd 
Sess., Sept. 6, 1990. 
 
Most District Courts held that Section 1367 did not 
overrule Zahn. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, 
S 3523.1, at 112 (1998 Supp.). However, the first appellate 
ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in In re 
Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1995), a 
class action, concluded that the text was clear on its face 
and that Zahn was overruled. The Court discussed the 
scholarly controversy over the matter and declined to rely 
on the legislative history because the statute was neither 
"unclear or ambiguous." Id. at 528. 
 
The issue was next considered by the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Stromberg was not a class action, but involved only two 
plaintiffs joined for convenience. The Court discussed the 
difficulties with interpretation of the statute and called 
attention to its text. Indicating that it was "reluctant to 
create a conflict among the circuits on a jurisdictional 
issue," id. at 930, the Court held that Section 1367 permits 
aggregation. See id. at 932. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
academic drafters or Congress. See 16 Moore et al., supra, P 106.44, at 
106-62 to 106-63. Federal Practice and Procedure takes a broader view, 
noting as compelling evidence that overruling Zahn would be 
inconsistent with the often-mentioned purpose of codifying the pre-Finley 
conception of supplemental jurisdiction. See 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
supra, S 3523.1, at 112 (Supp. 1998). 
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, did 
not hesitate to take issue with both Abbott and Stromberg 
in Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., ___ F.3d ____, No. 97- 
8078, 1998 WL 789494 (10th Cir. Nov. 13, 1998). The 
Court believed that section "1367(a) and (b) can be read 
literally, and unambiguously, to require each plaintiff in a 
class action diversity case to satisfy the Zahn definition of 
`matter in controversy' and to individually meet the $75,000 
requirement." Id. at *10. 
 
In view of the holdings of the other Courts of Appeals to 
the contrary, however, Leonhardt assumed ambiguity in the 
statutory text and turned to the legislative history. See id. 
There, it found substantial evidence that "Congress did not 
intend to overrule the historical rules prohibiting 
aggregation of claims, including Zahn's prohibition of such 
aggregation in diversity class actions." Id. 
 
We have not yet taken a position on the proper 
construction of Section 1367. Although on two occasions 
we have called attention to the problem, we have not been 
required to meet it. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
Sales Practices Lit., 148 F.3d 283, 303-06 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In Russ v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
961 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1997), Judge Louis Pollak of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after a careful and 
exhaustive examination of the origin and legislative history 
of Section 1367, concluded that Zahn retained its vitality. 
See id. at 820. Judge Pollak's phraseology, in rejecting the 
textual approach of Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg, 
caught the eye of the Leonhardt Court: "To retain this case 
in this court is to say to Congress: `We know what you 
meant to say, but you didn't quite say it. So the message 
from us in the judicial branch to you in the legislative 
branch is: "Gotcha! And better luck next time." ' " Id. at 
820; see also Leonhardt, 1998 WL 789494, at *10 n.9 
(quoting Russ). 
 
The proper construction of Section 1367 is squarely 
presented by this appeal, and we must therefore stake out 
our position. Our reading of the statute, particularly the 
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limitations placed on diversity cases in subsection (b) as 
contrasted with the broad scope of supplemental 
jurisdiction granted in other instances of federal 
jurisdiction in subsection (a), convinces us that Section 
1367 was not intended to substantially expand diversity 
jurisdiction. Setting aside the holding in Zahn and Clark 
would have such an effect. 
 
Subsection (b) notes a number of instances where 
"exercising supplemental jurisdiction . . . would be 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332." Although subsection (b) does not list Rule 23, the 
exercising of supplemental jurisdiction in class actions 
would certainly be inconsistent with barring it in joinder 
cases under Rule 19, which is cited in the text. Similarly 
out of keeping is subsection (b)'s prohibition of"claims by 
plaintiffs against persons made parties" under Rule 20, but 
its silence as to "claims by persons proposed to be joined as 
plaintiffs" under that Rule.6 
 
Although there is much to be said for Leonhardt's view 
that the text does not displace Zahn's ruling, we conclude 
that there is sufficient ambiguity in the statute to make 
resort to the legislative history appropriate. As noted 
earlier, the House Report leaves no doubt that Congress 
intended Zahn's restrictions to remain in effect. See H.R. 




6. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th 
Cir. 1996), points out the anomaly in Section 1367(b), which lists Rule 
20 among the Rules which plaintiffs may not use to bring claims 
"against" persons under supplemental jurisdiction, even though the text 
does not prohibit Rule 20 joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs. See id. at 
932. 
Subsection (b) denies jurisdiction over persons proposed to be joined as 
plaintiffs under Rule 19 or intervening under Rule 24 "when exercising 
supplemental diversity jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." The omission of Rule 20 at 
that point is an unintentional drafting gap, but the legislative history 
provides more than adequate evidence that Congress did not intend to 
allow such an obvious evasion of the diversity statute. See Rowe, 
Burbank & Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion, supra, at 960 
n.90. Courts should not reach out to undermine Section 1332's 
requirements. See id. at 961 n.91; see also Packard, 994 F.2d at 1044- 
45 (courts should narrowly construe the removal statute). 
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Even were we to conclude that Section 1367 is 
unambiguous, as Abbott Laboratories read it, we would 
nevertheless turn to the legislative history because this is 
one of those "rare cases [in which] the literal application of 
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters." United States v. Sherman, 
150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
removed, alterations in original); see also United States v. 
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (same). 
 
Our review of the text, legislative history, and origins of 
Section 1367 leads us to hold that it preserves the 
prohibition against aggregation outlined in Zahn v. 
International Paper Co. and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., and 
thus maintains the traditional rules governing diversity of 





In the case before us, if the separate claims of Quinlan 
did not meet the jurisdictional limit of $50,000 in effect at 
the time of removal, they must be remanded. In its notice 
of removal, St. Paul alleged that the value of all of the 
matters in controversy would exceed $50,000. It also stated 
that "[p]laintiffs have previously advised St. Paul that the 
cost to replace the deteriorated roof exceeded $250,000.00." 
St. Paul did not, however, indicate the amount in 
controversy as to each of the three named plaintiffs. 
 
Five months later, on November 27, 1995, the plaintiffs 
filed their pretrial statement, stating that Quinlan's 
compensatory damages were worth less than $5,000. St. 
Paul's pretrial statement of December 7, 1995 asserted that 
"Quinlan's claim of approximately $4900 is jurisdictionally 
insufficient." In response to St. Paul's motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs conceded that it was unlikely that even 
the joinder of bad faith damages would boost Quinlan's 
claim over the $50,000 minimum. Instead, plaintiffs argued 
for supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367, citing 
Stromberg. Thus, more than a year before the entry of 
summary judgment, the jurisdictional issue had been 
raised, unlike cases where the problem became apparent 
only after judgment. 
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The burden of establishing the amount in controversy in 
removal cases rests on the defendant. See Abels, 770 F.2d 
at 29. The record here demonstrates St. Paul's failure to 
meet its burden, based on representations in its own 
pretrial statements. In addition, plaintiffs acknowledge that 
Quinlan's damages do not exceed $50,000, making it clear 
that a jurisdictional problem exists. 
 
In Angus v. Shiley, Inc., 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
concluded that removal jurisdiction established by the 
plaintiff's original complaint would not be destroyed by an 
amended complaint. See id. at 145. Here, however, both 
plaintiffs' and defendant's statements in the circumstances 
of this case make it obvious that Quinlan's compensatory 
damages did not exceed $5,000 at the moment of removal. 
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 97 
(3d Cir. 1996); Tonghook America, Inc. v. Shipton 
Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1994); Jones v. 
Knox Exploration Co., 2 F.3d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
Quinlan also requests damages under Pennsylvania's bad 
faith insurer statute, including punitive damages, attorney's 
fees, and costs. Where a claim for punitive damages 
"comprises the bulk of the amount in controversy and may 
have been colorably asserted solely or primarily for the 
purpose of conferring jurisdiction, that claim should be 
given particularly close scrutiny." Packard, 994 F.2d at 
1046. 
 
In Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 1997), 
we found it necessary to remand to the District Court to 
determine whether a potential award of attorneys' fees 
would raise the amount of damages plaintiff could claim. 
That further step is not required here because, as Angus 
observed, although a court can make an independent 
appraisal of the reasonable value of the claim, see 989 F. 
2d at 146, it might also consider a stipulation as "clarifying 
rather than amending an original pleading." Id. at 145 n.3. 
Because of Quinlan's concession that even including 
possible punitive and other damages, its total claim will not 
surpass $50,000, and because St. Paul does not argue 
otherwise, we need not delay our ruling at this stage. 
 
In addition to Quinlan's concession, the record shows 
that Meritcare's claims for losses over and above the roof 
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repair costs and business interruption are based on the 
alleged bad-faith handling of the insurance claim. 
According to the pretrial statements, delay in adjusting the 
claim caused plaintiffs to lose an opportunity to purchase 
the nursing home from Caring. But that option was granted 
in the lease to Meritcare, not to Quinlan, which has no 
claim to any loss from that source. 
 
Moreover, Quinlan did not incur any expense to repair 
the roof. Nothing in the record supports any claims by 
Quinlan beyond the losses it suffered via lost sales to 
residents of the facility during the period from December 
31, 1994 to June 15, 1995. The record thus provides no 
basis for additional sums due Quinlan for alleged bad faith 
or reimbursement of attorneys' fees. 
 
Thus, there is no necessity for a remand to determine 
what the record already establishes -- that Quinlan's 
claims do not exceed the requisite jurisdictional amount. In 
this state of the appeal, we will therefore exercise our 
authority to sever Quinlan's claims and direct that its case 
be remanded to the state court. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. 
Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 827, 837 (1989) (Court of 




No jurisdictional obstacle appears to exist as to Meritcare 
and it is therefore appropriate to consider the merits of the 
District Court's entry of summary judgment. We exercise a 
plenary standard when reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment. See Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 
195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals applies the 
same test as the District Court, and must affirm if " `there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " 
Id. (citation omitted). " `[I]nferences ... drawn from the 
underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. The non- 
movant's allegations must be taken as true and, when 
these assertions conflict with those of the movant, the 
former must receive the benefit of the doubt.' " Id. (most 
alterations in original, citation omitted). 
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The District Court reviewed the undisputed facts in some 
detail. We may summarize them as follows. Under the 
terms of the Caring lease, Meritcare was to provide for 
maintenance and repair of the nursing home facility. 
Meritcare states, however, that over the years, Caring had 
taken responsibility for the integrity of the facility's roof. 
 
In November 1994, Caring received a report stating that 
the plywood in the roof was "in an advanced stage of 
degradation and a[n] extremely high potential of 
catastrophic failure as a result of impact loads[existed] 
. . . . catastrophic failure may occur under severe wind or 
snow loads." The cause of the degradation was the 
application of fire-retardant chemicals to the plywood. An 
architectural firm made similar findings in January 1995. 
 
St. Paul then retained an engineer to inspect the roof. He 
reported that there had been degradation of the plywood 
and the wood roof frame requiring repair or replacement. 
However, he said that "[t]he structural elements in the roof 
system are the concrete planks which have not suffered any 
loss of strength. General collapse of the roof into the patient 
rooms can not occur . . . . Even if small portions of the 
sheathing do fall into the attic, there would not be 
significant impact loading to damage the concrete planks 
and collapse of the roof would not occur." 
 
The relevant portions of the St. Paul policy read: "We'll 
insure covered property against the risk of direct physical 
loss or damage involving collapse of a building or any part 
of a building . . . . under level 3 protection when the 
collapse is due to any of the [following causes, including] 
. . . .3. Hidden decay." However, "[c]ollapse does not include 
settling, cracking, bulging, shrinking, or expansion." Nor is 
there coverage for losses due to wear and tear, 
deterioration, corrosion, or the inherent nature (i.e., latent 
defect) of property, or for "settling, cracking, bulging, 
shrinking or expansion of a . . . roof or ceiling." 
 
Meritcare contends that the collapse provision is 
triggered when the structural integrity of the building or a 
part thereof is seriously impaired. St. Paul contends that 
under Pennsylvania law, there had been no "collapse." It is 
undisputed that the roof did not cave in, and was replaced 
before such an adverse consequence occurred. 
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The District Court reviewed pertinent Pennsylvania case 
law, which culminated in a Superior Court case that held 
"collapse" means "to fall together or fall in." Dominick v. 
Statesman Ins. Co., 692 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997), alloc. denied, 1998 Pa. LEXIS 466 (Pa. Mar. 18, 
1998). Noting that no such event had occurred, the District 
Court entered summary judgment in favor of St. Paul. 
Because St. Paul's counterclaims remained for disposition, 
the District Court entered a certification offinality under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the summary judgment. 
 
On appeal, Meritcare notes that the word "collapse" is not 
defined in the policy and is capable of several meanings, 
including when structural integrity is seriously impaired. It 
argues that to require the insured to wait until a structure 
falls in before making a claim is contrary to the law in a 
number of states, and to the holdings in some Pennsylvania 
trial courts. Meritcare also cites Ercolani v. Excelsior 
Insurance Co., 830 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1987), which held in 
favor of the insured in an analogous situation, as an 
example of that approach. 
 
Unlike Ercolani, where New Jersey courts had not ruled 
on the "collapse" issue, we conclude that here 
Pennsylvania's appellate opinions control the outcome. In 
Skelly v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 169 A. 78 (Pa. 1933), the 
damage to the insured's house consisted of a large hole in 
the side of the structure and demolition of part of two 
walls. The rest of the home stood intact. The Court denied 
recovery, finding that the term "collapse" was to be given its 
"plain, ordinary meaning." Id. at 79. Referring to dictionary 
definitions, the Court required a "fall[ing] together 
suddenly" or "[t]o fall together, or into an irregular mass or 
flattened form, through the loss of firm connection or 
rigidity and support of the parts or loss of the contents, as 
a building through the falling in of its sides." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Kattelman v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 202 
A.2d 66 (Pa. 1964), the Court found no collapse where a 
break occurred in one of the outside walls, the building 
broke away from the adjoining party wall, plaster fell, and 
doors were jammed. See id. at 67. However, the structure 
remained standing and none of the floors, walls or roof fell 
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in. The Court followed Skelly and concluded that the 
structural damage did not constitute collapse "[i]n ordinary 
speech." Id. 
 
In Dominick, rotting joists caused the first floor to move 
downward and separate from the interior walls. The 
Superior Court noted that just as in Kattelman, neither the 
walls, floors, or roof had fallen in. Consequently, the 
insureds had not experienced collapse as the term is 
"construed under both Pennsylvania law and in accordance 
with its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. at 192. 
 
These cases set out the law of Pennsylvania on the 
subject. We cannot, therefore, follow Ercolani where, in 
predicting New Jersey law, we decided that collapse meant 
"a serious impairment of structural integrity." Ercolani, 830 
F.2d at 34. We are not free to follow New Jersey in the case 
before us, but must instead accept that of Pennsylvania.7 
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not err 
in determining that a "collapse" did not occur and that 
Meritcare was not entitled to recover under the policy. 
Because we have concluded that no collapse occurred, we 
need not reach the other points raised in plaintiffs' brief. 
 
The judgment of the District Court in favor of St. Paul 
and against Meritcare will be affirmed. The case of Quinlan 
Medical, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. will be 
remanded to the District Court to be remanded to the Court 




7. This case illustrates the anomalous effect of removal in many cases. 
Here, the issue is purely a matter of state law in which the only 
authoritative interpretation must come from the state court system. And 
yet, the insurance company removed the case from a well-respected trial 
court that is current in its work to the federal courts, which have only 
the power to predict, not settle, state law. Cases such as this lend 
strength to the suggestion that Congress should reinstate the 
requirement that before removal, a party must show prejudice would 
result if the case remained in the state forum. See Additional Views of 
Judge Merritt, Joined by Justice White, Concerning the Appropriate 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 77, 80 & n.144 (Dec. 18, 
1998); see also Study Committee Report at 15. 
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